In this study, we analyze why commercial banks failed during the recent financial crisis. We find that traditional proxies for the CAMELS components, as well as measures of commercial real estate investments, do an excellent job in explaining the failures of banks that were closed during 2009, just as they did in the previous banking crisis of 1985 -1992. Surprisingly, we do not find that residential mortgage-backed securities played a significant role in determining which banks failed and which banks survived.
Introduction
Why have U.S. commercial banks failed during the ongoing financial crisis that began in early 2008 with the failure of Bear Stearns? The seemingly obvious answer is that investments in the "toxic" residential mortgage-based securities (RMBS), primarily those that were fashioned from subprime mortgages, brought them down; but that turns out to be the wrong answer, at least for commercial banks. Certainly, toxic securities were problematic for investment banks and the largest commercial banks and their holding companies, but none of these large commercial banks have technically failed.
2 Yet, in 2009, the FDIC reported that it closed 140 smaller depository institutions; and, through June 2010 it closed another 86. What were the factors that caused these failures? In this study, we provide the answer to this question.
There has been little analysis of recent bank failures, primarily because there were so few failures during recent years. 3 We aim to fill this gap. Using logistic regressions, we estimate an empirical model explaining the determinants of commercial bank failures that occurred during 1 Commonly attributed to Warren Buffet.
2 Of course, in late 2008, some -perhaps many -of these large banks were insolvent on a markto-market basis, and, thus, could be considered to have failed economically. However, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) effectively bailed them out. Exceptions include the demise of Washington Mutual in September 2008 and of Wachovia in October 2008; but, in both cases, these banks were absorbed by acquirers at no cost to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); and neither was extensively involved in the toxic securities (but, instead, had originated bad mortgages that were retained in their loan portfolios).
2009, using standard proxies for the CAMELS 4 ratings as explanatory variables. An important feature of our analysis is that we estimate alternative models that predict the 2009 failures using data from successively earlier years, stretching from 2008 back to 2004. By so doing, we are able to ascertain early indicators of likely difficulties for banks, as well as late indicators.
Not surprisingly, we find that traditional proxies for the CAMELS ratings are important determinants of bank failures in 2009, just as previous research has shown for the last major banking crisis in 1985 -1992 (see, e.g., Cole and Gunther (1995 , 1998 ). Banks with more capital, better asset quality, higher earnings, and more liquidity are less likely to fail. However, when we test for early indicators of failure, we find that the CAMELS proxies become successively less important, whereas portfolio variables become increasingly important. In particular, real-estate loans play a critically important role in determining which banks survive and which banks fail. Real estate construction and development loans, commercial mortgages, and multi-family mortgages are consistently associated with a higher likelihood of bank failure, whereas residential single-family mortgages are either neutral or may be associated with a lower likelihood of bank failure. These results are consistent with the findings of Cole and Fenn (2008) , who examine the role of real estate in explaining bank failures from the 1985 -1992 period.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we provide a brief literature review. Section 3 discusses our model and our data, and introduces our explanatory 4 CAMELS is an acronym for Capital adequacy; Asset quality; Management; Earnings; Liquidity; and Sensitivity to market risk. The Uniform Financial Rating System, informally known as the CAMEL ratings system, was introduced by U.S. regulators in November 1979 to assess the health of individual banks. Following an onsite bank examination, bank examiners assign a score on a scale of one (best) to five (worst) for each of the five CAMEL components; they also assign a single summary measure, known as the "composite" rating. In 1996, CAMEL evolved into CAMELS, with the addition of a sixth component to summarize Sensitivity to market risk.
variables. In Section 4, we provide our main logit regression results. Section 5 contains our robustness checks, and Section 6 offers a brief conclusion.
Literature Review
In this section, we will not try to provide a complete literature review on the causes of bank failures because recent papers by Torna (2010) and Demyanyk and Hasan (2009) contain extensive reviews; we refer interested readers to those studies for further depth.
Instead, we wish to make two points: First, there are surprisingly few papers that have econometrically explored the causes of recent bank failures. 5 We are aware only of Torna (2010), 6 who focuses on whether "modern banking activities and techniques" 7 are associated with commercial banks' becoming financially troubled and/or insolvent. 8 Torna empirically
tests separately for what causes a healthy bank to become troubled (which is defined as being in 5 We exclude from this category the extensive, and still growing, literature on the failures of the subprime-based residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). For examples of such analyses, see Gorton (2008) , Acharya and Richardson (2009 ), Brunnermeier (2009 ), Coval et al. (2009 ), Mayer et al. (2009 ), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2010 ), and Krishnamurthy (2010 . 6 It is striking that, in the literature reviews provided by Torna (2010) First, his study focuses on the distinction between "traditional" and "modern" banking activities, but doesn't explore the finer detail among "traditional" banking activities, such as types of loans, which is a central feature of our study. Second, his study looks back for only a year to find the determinants of healthy banks' becoming troubled and troubled banks' failing, whereas we look back as far as five years prior to the failures. Third, by including only troubled banks among the candidates for failure (which is consistent with the one-year look-back period), his study is limited in its ability to consider longer and broader influences, whereas all commercial banks are included in our analysis. Fourth, a ranking based only upon capital ignores five of the six CAMELS components and likely seriously misclassifies "problem banks." For all of these reasons, we do not consider Torna's study to be a close substitute for ours.
The second point that we wish to make in this section concerns the studies of the bank and thrift failures of the 1980s and early 1990s -e.g., Cole and Fenn (2008) for commercial 9 Torna (2010) cannot directly identify the banks that are on the FDIC's "troubled banks" list each quarter because the FDIC releases the total number of troubled banks, but keeps their identities confidential. As an estimate of those identities, Torna considers "troubled banks" specifically to be the number of banks at the bottom of the Tier 1 capital ranking that is equal to the number of banks that are on the FDIC's "troubled banks" list for each quarter. Torna's method provides only a crude approximation to these identities because this method ignores all but one of the CAMELS components that likely go into the FDIC's determination of "troubled bank" status. 
where:
There were 117 commercial banks that failed during 2009; but, clearly, there are many more banks that will fail during 2010 -2012 from the same or similar underlying causes. To ignore this latter group is to impose a form of right-hand censoring; but, of course, the identities of the banks in this latter group could not be known as of year-end 2009. Rather than ignore them, we estimate their identities as follows: We count as a "technical failure" any bank reporting that the sum of equity plus loan loss reserves was less than half the value of its nonperforming assets, or, more formally:
(Equity + Reserves -0.5 x NPA) < 0 , 10 It is worth noting that of the 57 of the 74 commercial banks that failed during the first half of 2010 (77%) are members of our "technically failed" group.
Data and Explanatory Variables
The data that we use come from the FDIC Call Reports. traditionally been considered to be safe, low-risk investments for banks -especially since banks are prohibited from investing in "speculative" (i.e., "junk") bonds. The subprime RMBS debacle has shown that not all bonds that are rated as "investment grade" by the major credit rating agencies will necessarily remain in that category for very long. Nevertheless, as a general matter we expect this category (which includes the RMBS) to have a negative effect on a bank's failing, especially for smaller banks that generally refrained from purchasing the subprime-based RMBS that proved so toxic.
BD (Brokered Deposits):
These are deposits that are raised through national brokers rather than from local customers. Although there is nothing inherently wrong with a bank's deciding to raise its funds in this way, brokered deposits have traditionally been seen as a way for a bank to gather funds and grow quickly; and rapid growth has often been synonymous with risky growth.
Consequently, we expect this variable to have a positive effect on failure. 
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RER14 (Real Estate Residential Single-Family (1-4) Mortgages):
Prior to the current crisis, single-family 13 residential mortgages were generally considered to be safe, worthwhile loans for banks; the failure of millions of subprime mortgages has thrown some doubt on this proposition.
Because most residential mortgages are not subprime, our general expectation is that RER14
would have a negative influence on a bank's failing.
REMUL (Real Estate Multifamily Mortgages):
Lending on commercial multifamily properties has had a history of being troublesome for banks and other lenders (including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); consequently, we expect it to have a positive influence on failing.
RECON (Real Estate Construction & Development Loans):
This is a category of lending that has been extraordinarily risky for banks in the past; we expect it to have a positive influence on failure.
RECOM (Real Estate Nonfarm Nonresidential Mortgages):
This is a category of commercial real estate loans, such as office buildings, and retail malls that proved especially toxic during the previous banking crisis. We expect it to be positively related to failure.
CI (Commercial & Industrial Loans):
This is a category of lending in which commercial banks are expected to have a comparative advantage. We expect it to have a negative influence on failure.
CONS (Consumer Loans):
This encompasses automobile loans, other consumer durables loans, and credit card loans, as well as personal unsecured loans. Again, this is an area where banks should have a comparative advantage. We expect a negative influence on failure. 
Univariate Comparisons
Tables 2A -2E provides the means and standard errors for all banks and separately for the subsamples of surviving banks and failed banks, along with t-tests for statistically significant differences in the means of the surviving and failing groups. Tables 2A -2E provide descriptive statistics for 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004 , respectively, so that we can see how the differences in the two subsamples evolved over the five years prior to the 2009 failures.
In Table 2A In Table 2E are the univariate comparisons based upon 2004 data, which should reflect the portfolio allocations that led to the shockingly high rates of NPAs and associated losses reflected in ROA and Total Equity found in Table 2A . Surprisingly, the failed banks had higher capital ratios than did the surviving banks back in 2004, although the difference is not statistically significant. Asset quality as measured by NPAs was virtually identical at 0.014.
Profitability ( Table 3 provides a summary of significant differences in means across the five years 
Logit Regression Results
In Table 4 are the results of a set of logistic regression models that provide the main results of our study. In these models, the dependent variable is equal to one if a bank failed The results in the first pair of columns, which are based upon the financial data reported just prior to failure, we find that the standard CAMELS proxies have the expected signs and are highly significant. Lower capital as measured by equity to assets was associated with a higher probability of failure, as was worse asset quality as measured by NPAs to assets, lower earnings as measured by ROA, and worse liquidity as measured by Cash & Due to assets, Investment
Securities to assets, and Brokered Deposits to assets. These results closely follow the univariate results presented in Panel A of As we move back in time in the subsequent pairs of columns in Table 4, In Table 5 , we present a summary of the results in Table 4 . As can be seen, there are six variables that are consistently significant for at least four of the five years prior to measurement of our outcome of failure or survival. Two are standard CAMELS proxies: asset quality as measured by the ratio of Nonperforming Assets to total assets, and earnings as measured by ROA. Brokered deposits, as an indicator of rapid growth and likely a negative indicator of asset quality and of management quality, has a clear negative influence. Table 5 are the variables that are not significant throughout the periods. Of these, the most striking is the ratio of capital (Total Equity) to assets, which loses its explanatory power when we move back more than two years prior to failure. In contrast, the ratio of Loan Loss Reserves to total assets is significant three and more years prior to failure but loses its significance during the two years prior to failure.
Robustness Checks and Extensions
In this section, we provide a set of robustness checks on our basic results, as well as extending them in interesting ways. First, we exclude our technical failures (i.e., we count as failures only those banks that actually failed in 2009) and re-estimate our logit models. Second, we exclude the actual failures (i.e., we count as failures only those banks that were technically insolvent at the end of 2009, including 57 banks that actually did fail during the first half of 2010) and re-estimate our logit models. Third, we rerun our logit models excluding banks with more than $10 billion in total assets. Fourth, we split our sample into large and small banks and re-estimate our logit models separately for these two groups. Fifth, we add dummy variables for the states that have had the lion's share of bank failures. Sixth, we add dummy variables that represent the primary federal regulator of the commercial bank. Seventh, we recalculate our technical failures by using a disaggregated measure of non-performing assets with varying loss ratios that are applied to the different components. And eighth, we re-estimate our logit models with the inclusion of the actual failures of the actual bank failures in the first half of 2010.
Exclusion of Technical Failures
signs and significance shown in Table 4 , and the variable Residential Single-Family Mortgages becomes a consistently significant negative influence on failure.
As was explained above, our FAIL variable includes the banks that actually failed in 2009 plus our calculation of banks that were likely to fail within the next year or two. Because the latter are estimated, for one robustness check we exclude the technically failed banks, and reestimate our model with FAIL encompassing only the banks that actually were closed by the FDIC during 2009. As can be seen in Table 6 and the summary in Table 7 , the results for this more limited sample of failed banks basically replicate our basic results in Tables 4 and 5 . There are, however, some notable differences: Brokered Deposits do not show up as significant for this group; Residential Single-Family Mortgages are generally a negative influence on failure; and Nonfarm Nonresidential Mortgages are insignificant.
Exclusion of Actual Failures
In Table 8 we estimate our model with FAIL encompassing only the technically failed banks (excluding the banks that were actually closed by the FDIC in 2009), and Table 9 provides a summary. We find that the results again are basically similar to our basic results; but, again, there are some differences: Cash & Due (a liquidity measure) is less important in explaining the failures of these banks; and Consumer Loans are wholly insignificant as an influence on failure.
Exclusion of the Largest Banks
It is clear that the largest banks were those that were most likely to have invested in the "toxic" RMBS securities. Perhaps these banks are atypical of the remaining thousands of smaller banks and are somehow influencing our results? As a third robustness check, we exclude the 40 banks with more than $10 billion in total assets for each earlier time period from which our alternative sets of explanatory variables are drawn. The results of this exercise, which are available upon request from the authors, basically replicate those shown in Tables 4 and 5 . This indicates that our results are not driven by the oddities of these large banks.
Dividing the Sample into Small Banks and Large Banks.
In addition to excluding the largest banks, we also divide our overall sample into "small"
and "large" banks, using $300 million as our demarcation point. We choose $300 million in order to ensure that there are a sufficient number of failures in the "large bank" subsample for estimating the logit model. Tables 10 and 12 provide the estimation results for the large and small banks, respectively, with Tables 11 and 13 providing summaries of these respective results.
As can be seen, the basic results hold for both small and large banks, with a few notable exceptions. Specifically, ROA is a weaker negative influence on failures for large banks than for small banks; Securities play no role in failures for large banks, whereas they are a significant negative influence on failures for small banks; and Nonfarm Nonresidential Mortgages are a significant positive influence on failure for only the two years preceding the failures of large banks, whereas these commercial mortgages are significant positive influences on failures for years two through five prior to failure but not for the year immediately preceding failure for small banks.
Adding State Dummy Variables
Casual observation suggests that some states have experienced more extensive numbers of bank failures than have others. To control for this, we include as additional explanatory variables a set of indicators (i.e., dummy variables) for these "high volume" states -Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, and Nevada. We find that indicators for FL, Tables 4 and 5 continue to hold. (Again, these results are available from the authors upon request)
Disaggregating Non-Performing Assets
In our basic results, we describe a technical failure as a bank that did not fail during 2009
but that had at year-end 2009:
(Equity + Reserves -0.5*NPA) < 0.
Since there are a number of components to NPA, as an additional robustness check we explore the possibility of applying different "haircuts" (i.e., percentage estimates of loss) to the different components. Specifically, we apply a haircut of 20% to loans that were past due 30-89 days and still accruing interest (PD3089), a haircut of 50% to loans that were past due 90+ days and still accruing interest (PD90+), and a haircut of 100% (i.e., a total writeoff) to nonaccrual loans (NonAccrual) and to other real estate owned (OREO). We then redefined technical failures as Equity + Reserves -0.2*PD3089 -0.5*PD90+ -1.0*(NonAccrual + OREO) < 0.
At the end of 2009 there were 347 banks that satisfied this modified definition of technical failure. 17 When we include these modified technical failures in our measure of FAIL and reestimate our basic logit regressions, our basic results continue to hold. (Again, these results are available from the authors on request)
Including the Failed Banks from the First Half of 2010
There were 74 commercial banks that failed during the first half of 2010. When we include these banks in FAIL and re-estimate our logit regressions, our basic results continue to hold. This is not surprising, as 57 of these 74 were members of our technically insolvent failures.
(Again, these results are available from the authors on request)
Miscellaneous Additional Robustness Tests
In addition to the robustness checks described above, we tested a number of additional modifications to our explanatory variables, but failed to find significant results. These included:
home equity loans; annual percentage growth of assets; a dummy variable for RECOM > 300% of equity; a dummy variable for RECON > 100% of equity; squared terms for RECOM, RECON, and REMUL; advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank System as a percentage of assets; and separate categories of charge-offs corresponding to consumer, C&I, and various categories of real estate loans. Our results suggest that the number of bank failures will continue at elevated levels for several years, just as they did during the last crisis. We also find that real estate loans play an especially important role in determining which banks survive and which banks fail. Banks with higher loan allocations to construction and development loans, commercial mortgages, and multi-family mortgages are especially likely to fail, whereas higher loan allocations to residential single-family mortgages are either neutral or may help banks survive. Surprisingly, investments in mortgage-backed securities appear to have little or no impact on the likelihood of failure. In fact, banks with higher allocations to investment securities of all kinds are significantly less likely to fail.
These results are important for at least two reasons: First, they offer support for the CAMELS approach to judging the safety and soundness of commercial banks. And, second, they indicate that most banks in the current crisis are failing in ways that are quite recognizable to anyone who went through the bank failure episode of the 1980s and early 1990s.
Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose… Table 2 ; +,-indicate significant differences at the 10% level of significance or stronger. + indicates that the mean for surviving banks is greater than the mean for failing banks, and -indicates that the mean for surviving banks is less than the mean for failing banks. Table 4 Logistic Regression Results: All Banks +,-indicate significant (at the 10% level or stronger) positive or negative regression coefficients from the logistic regressions in Table 4 . + indicates a positive relation with the probability of failure and -indicates a negative relation with the probability of failure. Table 7  Summary of Significant Results from Table 6 Logistic Regression Results: FDIC Closed Banks Only +,-indicate significant (at the 10% level or stronger) positive or negative regression coefficients from the logistic regressions in Table 6 . + indicates a positive relation with the probability of failure and -indicates a negative relation with the probability of failure. Table 8 . + indicates a positive relation with the probability of failure and -indicates a negative relation with the probability of failure. +,-indicate significant (at the 10% level or stronger) positive or negative regression coefficients from the logistic regressions in Table 10 . + indicates a positive relation with the probability of failure and -indicates a negative relation with the probability of failure. Table 12 . + indicates a positive relation with the probability of failure and -indicates a negative relation with the probability of failure. 
